"The Right War" in Afghanistan?
Somehow the idea has evolved among both Democrats and Republicans, that Afghanistan is a "good war," to be prosecuted with the same zeal as Bush has demonstrated in Iraq. (The cover of Time magazine's July 28, 2008 cover is headlined "Afghanistan, The Right War, Why the West is failing there, and what to do about it.") Both Obama and the administration are talking about shifting military resources from Iraq to Afghanistan.
The notion of Afghanistan as “the right war,” seems to be based on the premise that Afghanistan under the Taliban harbored bin Laden and al Qaida during the plotting of 9/11 and, therefore, the Taliban should be displaced and a friendly government installed to a) deny al Qaida sanctuary and b) punish the Taliban (who are not likeable anyway) for 9/11. This idea of denying al Qaida a friendly “failed state” as a base of operations has also been cited as a reason to remain in Iraq.
The notion of bringing democracy to backward, benighted countries ruled by theocracies and dictators is an ideological fig leaf intended to cover up darker purposes — just as Napoleon used the pretext of spreading the democratic ideals of the French Revolution to attack and loot the monarchies of Europe. What does the average American, squeezed by lagging incomes, falling house prices, unaffordable health care and rising costs of living, really care about spreading democracy to recalcitrant Muslims mired in the Middle Ages halfway around the world? -- particularly when the cost of so doing includes forfeiting democratic rights and principles at home.
While the thirst for revenge is understandable, it is a poor foundation for policy, particularly one so expensive in blood and treasure.
The notion of denying al Qaida a friendly base of operations by subduing entire countries is plain silly and tragically flawed. It’s a facile sound bite, calculated to generate applause among brainwashed Americans, but does not stand up to even the most rudimentary analysis.
Given the number of failed and/or corrupt states in the world, al Qaida will never want for a square mile or two of secure territory from which to operate. The Middle East and Africa contain vast tracts of lawless territory hospitable to secretive, well-funded terrorists. Push them out of Afghanistan and they move into Pakistan, where the U.S. cannot and the Pakistanis will not pursue them.
Practically speaking, the U.S. would have a much better chance of decapitating al Qaida if they were holed up in Afghanistan under the protection of the Taliban. Having no regard for the Taliban’s sovereignty, the U.S. would be free to attack al Qaida bases from the air (as Clinton did, unsuccessfully) and/or with special ops teams, covert operations, paid double agents and informants. By way of contrast, the recent U.S. bombing of a suspected al Qaida hideout in Pakistan, created such a furor as to preclude any similar attempts in the future. Another such attack might topple the Pakistani government, placing Islamic extremists in control of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. Consequently, al Qaida is far more secure in Pakistan than they would be in a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.
It is self evident to all but the most reality-denying ideologues that continued U.S. military presence anywhere in the Middle East — accompanied by gory images of “collateral damage” in the form of mangled civilian bodies and jackbooted U.S. soldiers kicking down doors — is the best recruiting tool Islamic militants could hope for.
The smartest thing Washington could do is pull out of Afghanistan and hope al Qaida returns there, then pursue them with the targeted resources previously mentioned. However, such a course would require that Washington swallow its pride and demonstrate patience and cunning — not strong suits within the Beltway. It has been wisely said that Islamic extremists are playing chess while Washington is playing checkers.
To commit the financial and military resources of the U.S. to the task of denying sanctuary to al Qaida in every conceivable safe-haven is an expensive, unending game of Whack-A-Mole with no chance of success -- particularly when the U.S. is funding the enemy through purchases of drugs and oil. Is there no lesson to be learned from the Soviet experience in Afghanistan? I suppose it’s too much to ask that Americans remember the ill-fated British invasion of Afghanistan in 1838 which ended in complete annihilation of the British Army in 1842.
However, as with the war on drugs, Washington seems never willing to count the cost when engaged in moralistic crusade. Being on the verge of bankruptcy, the U.S. could be pushed into the abyss by continuing such folly, fulfilling bin Laden’s strategy: “Spread them out and bleed them into bankruptcy.”
(For more on this and other topics, visit www.cassandra-chronicles.com)