"The Right War" in Afghanistan? Part II
The news yesterday of the Taliban establishing “effective control of a strategically important district just 70 miles from the capital, Islamabad. . . raising new alarm about the ability of the government to fend off an unrelenting Taliban advance toward the heart of Pakistan.” (NY Times April 22, 2009) underscores the folly of the U.S.-led NATO war in Afghanistan. By displacing a significant contingent of the Taliban from Afghanistan into neighboring Pakistan, the U.S. has pushed the forces of radical Islam ever closer to obtaining control of nuclear weapons.
While NATO forces are fruitlessly expending significant blood and treasure fighting over a remote, vast pile of rock and dust, the displaced Taliban forces are making steady progress in undermining the political stability of a far richer, more modern, nuclear-armed neighbor. If the Taliban succeed in overthrowing the shaky Pakistani government, not only might they be in a position to supply terrorists with nuclear weaponry to smuggle into the West, but also to provoke a nuclear exchange with neighboring India. The mere fact of Islamic radicals seizing control of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal might prompt apprehensive India to launch a pre-emptive nuclear attack. Wouldn’t NATO’s resources be better spent further shoring up the Pakistani military and police forces?
The U.S. government’s longstanding policies not only in Afghanistan, but in the Middle East generally, are in dire need of a realignment of priorities. Bringing freedom and democracy to populations mentally mired in the Middle Ages, while risking the seizure of a nuclear arsenal by martyr-minded radicals still seeking to avenge the Crusades, is the very definition of misplaced priorities.
Perversely, the Bush policy of “fighting them there so we won’t have to fight them here” has made it all the more likely that we will have to “fight them here,” not only because of the possibility that nuclear-armed radicals might attempt to sneak nukes into the U.S., but also because of the fact that the mere presence of “infidels” on “holy soil” provokes ever-more antagonism toward the West among Muslims, many of whom are already residing here.
President Obama has the unique opportunity to re-evaluate America’s priorities. He has already set in motion the process of withdrawing from Iraq. Hopefully he will come to the same conclusion in Afghanistan, fully recognizing the likelihood that the Taliban will retake control of the country. So what?
If the U.S. provides the resources necessary to shore up the Pakistani government and imbue the Pakistani military with sufficient backbone to displace the Taliban from Pakistan, the Taliban would then wind up controlling that barren pile of rocks and dust. So al Qaida might set up shop there. Who cares? Al Qaida can always find a patch of ground from which to operate. Better they should be in isolated Afghanistan than in far better-connected, nuclear-armed Pakistan. In short, President Obama might do well to borrow a page from General W.T. Sherman, who upon being advised that his opponent, General Hood was making his way north from Atlanta, instead of opposing Sherman’s eastward march to the sea, facetiously exclaimed that he would gladly supply Hood with the provisions required to speed him on his journey.
One final thought, outside the box: leaving Afghanistan in the hands of radical extremists would provide them with revenues derived from the Afghan opium trade representing the majority of the world’s supply. The best response to this eventuality would be to legalize the narcotics trade, thereby drying up that source of funding not only to the Taliban but also the vast network of violent drug traffickers around the world. One of many residual benefits from such a course would be to eliminate the drug-related violence presently taking place on the streets of America and to an even greater extent just south of the border in Mexico.